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CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGES UNDER
FEDERAL AND VIRGINIA LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment focuses on the confidential communication privileges
recognized under federal and Virginia law. The history of rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is discussed in order to illustrate the policies
which Congress intended to further by enacting it and to shed some light
on how Congress intended the rule to operate. Discussion includes an ex-
amination of various trends or approaches which recent federal decisions
have taken in applying rule 501. Finally, specific privileges which have
been recognized by federal courts and specific privileges recognized under
Virginia law are enumerated.
II. FEDERAL COMMUNICATION PRIviLEGES GENERALLY
A. The Decision Not to Enumerate Specific Privileges
Rule 501' is the only federal rule dealing with the subject of privileges,
and it is substantially different from the rules of privilege contained in
Article V of the proposed rules of evidence promulgated by the Supreme
Court.2 Article V of the proposed rules listed nine specific non-
constitutional privileges recognized by the federal courts: required reports,
lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to
clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official
information, and identity of informer.3 Another proposed rule contained in
Article V provided that except as otherwise required by the Constiution or
provided by act of Congress, only those privileges set forth in Article V
would be recognized by federal courts.' The remaining rules proposed by
1. Rule 501 of the Federal Ruleg of Evidence provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
2. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
3. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 502-10. Id. at 235-56.
4. Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to: (1) Refuse to be a witness; or (2)
Refuse to disclose any matter; or (3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or (4)
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the Supreme Court in Article V concerned waiver of privilege, disclosure
of privileged matter under compulsion,' and commenting upon or drawing
an inference from a claim of privilege.
7
Because of strong disagreement as to the content of the proposed privi-
lege rules, and because of fear that this disagreement would prevent the
passage of an entire rules package, Congress rejected the specific rules of
privilege in favor of the present rule 501. 8 Thus, the federal courts must
Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object
or writing.
Proposed FED. R. EVID. 501. Id. at 230.
5. Proposed FED. R. EvID. 511, 56 F.R.D. 258 (1972), provided:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential
matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of
the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of
the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself a
privileged communication.
6. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 512, 56 F.R.D. 259 (1972) provided: "Evidence of a statement
or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if
the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the
privilege."
7. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 513, 56 F.R.D. 260 (1972), provided:
(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the
present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by
judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privi-
lege without the knowledge of the jury.
(c) Jury Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an
adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no infer-
ence may be drawn therefrom.
8. The reasons for the drastic amendment by Congress of the rules of privilege promul-
gated by the Supreme Court are aptly stated by the Senate Judiciary Committee report:
From the outset it was clear that the content of the proposed privilege provisions
was extremely controversial. Critics attacked, and proponents defended, the secrets of
state and official information privileges, with the nub of the disagreement being
whether the rule defining them was merely codifying existing law. In addition, the
husband husband-wife privilege drew fire as a result of the conscious decision of the
court to narrow its scope from that recognized under present Federal decisions. The
partial doctor-patient privilege seemed to satisfy no one, either doctors or patients; and
even the attorney-client privilege as drafted came in for its share of criticism because
of its failure to define representative of the client, a critical issue for corporations and
organizations. Much controversy also attended the failure to include a newsman's
privilege . . . . Finally, some commentators questioned the wisdom of promulgating
rules of privilege under the rules Enabling Act, on the ground that in their view, the
codification of the law of privilege should be left to the regular legislative process.
Since it was clear that no agreement was likely to be possible as to the content of
specific privilege rules, and since the inability to agree threatened to forestall or pre-
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deal with the law of privilege, many areas of which are highly controversial,
on a case-by-case basis, -interpreting the common law "in the light of
reason and experience."'
B. Conflict of Laws
Another source of Congressional dissatisfaction with the rules of privi-
lege proposed by the Supreme Court concerned the extent to which federal
courts should or must give effect to state privilege law. Under the proposed
Supreme Court rule, 0 federal privilege law would have applied in all cases,
including diversity cases in which state law furnished the rule of decision."
Congress, on the other hand, felt that in cases in which state law supplied
the rule of decision, state privilege law should be applied. 2
The Advisory Committee 3 offered several reasons for the refusal to rec-
ognize state privileges." First, while a privilege usually represents some
aspect of a relationship created by a state, the privilege is not ordinarily
one of the issues in litigation involving the relationship itself. In fact, when
the litigation does involve the relationship which gives rise to the privilege,
in many instances the privilege does not apply. For example, many stat-
vent passage of an entire rules package, the determination was made that the specific
privilege rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated and a single rule (rule 501)
substituted, leaving the law in its current condition to be developed by the courts of
the United States utilizing the principles of the common law.
S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in, [1974] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7051, 7053.
9. FED. R. EviD. 501.
10. Proposed FED. R. EvIv. 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1972).
11. At the time the proposed Supreme Court rules were drafted, it was well established
that in federal criminal prosecutions federal law governed on issues of substance and proce-
dure. Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
Concerning federal question cases, there were many cases holding that state privileges did
not apply. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 951 (1963); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953). With respect to
diversity cases, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence felt that Erie R. R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), did not require the application of state privilege law. The Advisory
Committee believed that under Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the question of
whether state privilege law applied in diversity cases was one of choice, not necessity. Advi-
sory Committee's Note to proposed FED. R. Evm. 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 232-33 (1972).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7075, 7082.
13. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United
States will be referred to throughout this Note as the Advisory Committee. The Advisory
Committee drafted the proposed rules which, after some revision by the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and after approval by the Judicial Conference, were
transmitted to the Supreme Court for promulgation.
14. Advisory Committee's Note to proposed FED. R. EVlD. 501,56 F.R.D. 183,233-34 (1972).
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utes make the marital communication privilege inapplicable in cases of
divorce. Thus, the privilege usually only applies when the litigation con-
cerns something substantively unrelated to the relationship which gives
rise to the privilege. The privilege appears in the case by accident, and
impedes the search for information.' 5 Secondly, since criminal prosecutions
entail more serious consequences than civil litigation, the criminal area has
the greatest sensitivity where privileges are concerned. However, state
privileges have traditionally not been applied in federal criminal prosecu-
tions. '6 If a privilege is denied in the area of greatest sensitivity, it becomes
illusory as a significant aspect of the relationship which gives rise to it. For
example, in a state having an accountant's privilege, little force would be
added to the privilege by enabling the accountant to assure his client that
although communications would not be privileged in federal criminal pros-
ecutions, the accountant could prevent disclosure in diversity cases and
state court proceedings. The state interest in privilege thus seems less
substantial than might first appear. Further, the federal interest in the
quality of federal judicial administration does not appear simply because
federal jurisdiction is based on diversity.'7 Thirdly, while it has been
argued that refusal to recognize state privileges would encourage forum
shopping, a large amount of forum shopping is recognized as legitimate in
the American judicial system. In principle, the basis for diversity jurisdic-
tion is the supposed need to escape from local prejudice. If choice of a
federal forum was solely confined to this basis, then complete conformity
to local procedure and substance would be required. This is not the case,
and choice of a federal forum may be influenced by a wide range of stra-
tegic factors.'
Congress was not persuaded by these arguments. Congress felt that fed-
eral law should not supersede state law in such substantive areas as privi-
leges without a compelling reason.'" In federal civil cases where an element
of a claim or defense is not based on a federal question, it was felt that
there was no fedral interest strong enough to justify departing from state
policy. 0 Further, there was concern that application of federal privilege
law in civil cases not based on a federal question would promote forum
shopping.'
15. Id. at 233.
16. See note 11 supra.
17. Advisory Committee's Note to proposed FED. R. EvID. 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 233 (1972).
18. Id. at 234.





Thus, Congress felt that state law should apply in federal civil cases
where state law supplied the rule of decision with respect to an element of
a claim or defense.- Since the Advisory Committee believed that this
result was not mandated by Erie, Congress felt it necessary to add the
second sentence of rule 501.2
It is clear from the language of rule 501 that in all. federal criminal
prosecutions and in federal question cases in which the evidence is offered
to prove an element of a claim or defense for which federal law supplies
the rule of decision, federal privilege law will apply. It also is clear that in
diversity cases in which the evidence is offered to prove an element of a
claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision, state law
will apply, and that in diversity cases in which the evidence is offered to
prove an element of a claim or defense for which federal law supplies the
rule of decision, federal law will apply. A problem arises, however, when
federal and state privilege law conflict in cases containing both federal and
state claims, and evidence is offered which is relevant to both claims.
One solution to this problem would be to apply the rule which favors the
admissibility of the evidence, regardless of whether it was the federal or
state rule. This approach would be consistent with the view taken by the
Senate Judiciary Committee and with the fundamental need of the ad-
versary system for full disclosure of all relevant facts.2 Another solution,
suggested by some commentators,27 would be to inquire into the respective
federal and state interests involved in the particular case. For example,
some state privileges may be so significant that they should be respected
when weighed against the need for evidence to prove the federal claim.
This approach would be consistent with the case-by-case approach to the
law of privilege which Congress intended. Another approach would be an
22. There was some disagreement between the Senate and House of Representatives con-
cerning the language used in rule 501. The Senate Judiciary Committee felt that the question
of what is an element of a claim or defense would be likely to cause considerable litigation,
since if the matter in question constituted an element of a claim or defense, state law would
apply, but if it was merely an item of proof with respect to a claim or defense, federal law
would seem to apply even though state law supplied the rule of decision. S. REp. No. 93-1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7058.
23. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See note 11 supra.
24. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Seass. 9, reprinted in, (1974) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7075, 7082.
25. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 n. 17, reprinted in, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7051, 7059.
26. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
27. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 199-200 (2d ed. 1977).
28. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 13, reprinted in, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7059.
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instruction to the jury that the evidence could only be considered as it
related to the claim for which it was not privileged. Such a limiting instruc-
tion, however, would probably only confuse the jury, and would offer no
real protection once the privilege was violated by the introduction of evi-
dence on the unprivileged claim."
A final solution to this dilemma would be for the federal court to refuse
to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claim. This solution is sup-
ported on the ground that jury confusion would result from holding evi-
dence admissible on one claim and inadmissible on the related claim, and
jury confusion is a recognized reason for refusing to exercise pendent juris-
diction.3 0 It remains to be seen how the federal courts will resolve this
problem.
A situation could arise in a federal question case where a federal court
adopts state law to fill gaps in federal statutes. Here, even though state
law is adopted, the federal court is applying federal law, and thus, state
law does not furnish the rule for decision, and federal privilege law will
apply.2 '
C. Recent Trends Under Rule 501: A Balancing Approach
In developing the federal common law of privilege "in the light of reason
and experience," as required by rule 501, some recent federal cases have
adopted a balancing approach, balancing the policies and interests in favor
of recognizing the particular privilege against the policies and interests
against recognition. 2 These cases view the rules of privilege as flexible,
rather than absolute, and the decision to recognize or deny the particular
privilege is made under the facts of the particular case.?
The most important and least varible interest against recognizing a
particular privilege is the need for full disclosure of all relevant facts.3 As
one recent decision has stated:
29. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 27, at 200.
30. This is the approach advocated by Professor Wright. See C. WmrTE, LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs § 93 (3d ed. 1976).
31. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in, [1974], U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7101.
32. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74
F.R.D. 565, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
affl'd, 563 F.2d 559 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
33. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74
F.R.D. 565, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
34. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. King 73
F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 559 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
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The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both funda-
mental and comprehensive . . . The very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence.n
In addition to this strong need for all relevant evidence in federal litiga-
tion generally, another factor which the federal courts have considered in
the balancing process is the special need, under the facts of the particular
case, for the information sought to be protected. 6 For example, one federal
decision has held that when a claim is brought for a violation of civil rights
under the Constitution, only strong countervailing public policies should
be allowed to prevent disclosure.3 Similarly, it has been held that the need
for information to secure a full and fair enforcement of federal law becomes
particularly strong when the information can only be obtained from the
source claiming the privilege."
Other factors to be considered in the balancing process are the import-
ance of the relationship or policy sought to be furthered by the privilege,
and the likelihood that recognition of the privilege under the facts of the
particular case will protect that relationship or policy. 9 For example, since
the policy underlying the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is to
promote family peace and harmony, the privilege was held not to apply to
a husband and wife who had been married for approximately forty years
and who could not seriously contend that the denial of the privilege would
have any effect on their marriage at all.4"
Another factor which federal courts have considered in developing fed-
eral common law under rule 501 is whether the particular privilege being
claimed would be recognized under state law.4' Recent federal cases have
taken the view that because of a strong policy of comity between federal
and state sovereignties, federal courts should recognize state privileges
when this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive
and procedural policy. 2 One reason for this view is the awareness that the
benefit of a state's promise of protection from disclosure would greatly
decrease if persons relying on the privilege in deciding whether or not to
35. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
36. United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 563 F.2d 559 (1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
37. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
38. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. King, 73
F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y 1976), affl'd, 563 F.2d 559 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
42. Id.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
communicate knew that disclosure could be forced in a federal court. '3
Since a federal court's denial of a state privilege would thus greatly lessen
the benefit of the privilege, the citizens of a state which holds out the
expectation of protection from disclosure should not be disappointed by a
mechanical and unnecessary application of a federal rule which would not
recognize the privilege."
In determining whether "the dictates of reason and experience," require
that the state privilege be adopted, a balancing test has again been ap-
plied.45 In addition to the general federal need for disclosure of all relevant
facts, and the special need for the information sought to be protected in
the particular case, factors considered are the importance of the relation-
ship or policy sought to be furthered by the state rule of privilege, the
probability that recognition of the privilege would advance that relation-
ship or policy, and the adverse impact on local policy which would result
from denying the privilege. 6 For example, in a case declining to recognize
a local privilege for city tax returns, the court noted that the primary policy
underlying the privilege was not encouraging honesty and candor on city
tax returns, but rather inducing other taxing authorities to furnish similar
information to the city, since if other authorities would furnish similar
information to the city, the city would lift the privilege . 7 Further, the court
felt that any adverse impact on the local policy of honest reporting by
taxpayers would be small, since it was likely that no one would be affected
in the preparation of a city tax return by the knowledge that disclosure of
information contained in the return could be forced in a federal tax prose-
cution.4 8
Another factor considered in determining whether a state privilege
should be recognized is whether disclosure can be made ir. such a manner
as to least offend the state policies giving rise to the privilege. 9 For exam-
ple, in a case seeking discovery of records containing information obtained
from communications between students and psychiatrists, which would
have been privileged under state law, the court allowed discovery, stating
that the adverse impact of the state policy of promoting psychotherapeutic
consultation could be reduced to an almost negligible level by deleting all
references to the students' identities contained in the reports. "
43. United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 563 F.2d 559 (1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
44. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
45. United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. at 105.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 107.
48. Id. at 108-09.
49. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. at 583.
50. Id. at 582-84.
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Another factor considered by some federal courts in developing federal
privilege law is the treatment afforded the particular privilege under the
rules of evidence which were proposed by the Supreme Court.5' Even
though the proposed rules were rejected by Congress, some courts have felt
that they still provide a useful standard from which analysis can proceed."2
In fact, one court has stated that, by promulgating the proposed rules, the
Supreme Court has rendered an advisory opinion on their constitution-
ality.53 Some commentators, however, warn against placing too much em-
phasis on the proposed rules since some of the rules represent a departure
from federal common law54 and in many instances the heavily critized
proposals were the result of compromises.15
III. PRIVILEGES RECOGNIZED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Attorney-client
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest confidential communication
privilege. Originally belonging to the attorney, the privilege allowed him
to keep the secrets confided in him by his clients. 6 Now, however, the
privilege is based on the desire to encourage clients to make a full disclo-
sure to their attorneys, allowing them to render fully informed legal ad-
vice. 7
Many federal courts consider the essential elements of the privilege to
be those enumerated by Wigmore, 8 stated as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.59
As stated in the first and second requirements, the client must be seek-
ing legal advice from an attorney, and that attorney must have been acting
51. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d at 543; Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. at 584-85;
United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. at 105.
52. Id.
53. United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d cir. 1977).
54. See S. SALTzEURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 27, at 201.
55. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 27, at 77 (Supp. 1978).
56. United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. at 1046.
57. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
58. In re Fischel, 447 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d
280, 281 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964).
59. 8 J. WlGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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in his capacity as a professional legal advisor at the time the communica-
tions were made. Thus, if the attorney is acting as a business advisor,
collection agent, giving investment advice, or performing services usually
rendered by an accountant, the fact that he happens to be an attorney does
not make the communications privileged." Documents submitted to an
attorney for the preparation of income tax returns have been held not to
be covered by the attorney-client privilege if the attorney was not render-
ing other significant legal services in addition to preparing the returns."
However, if a client who is under investigation for federal tax law violations
gives information to an attorney in order to obtain legal assistance, this is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the attorney be acting in his
capacity as such.2
A somewhat related problem concerns the extent to which the attorney-
client privilege covers communications made to a non-lawyer for the pur-
pose of assisting the attorney in effectively representing the client. " The
extent to which such communications are covered by the attorney-client
privilege is determined by balancing the attorney's need for the non-
lawyer's assistance in effectively representing the client against the in-
creased potential for inaccuracy in the truth-finding process as depriving
the trier of fact of valuable information. 4 The attorney-client privilege has
been extended to cover communications to an accountant" and a psychia-
trist 6 when acting in the capacity of agents of the attorney, if such commu-
nications were made by the client in confidence and for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice.
Wigmore's third and fifth requirements for the attorney-client privilege
are somewhat misleading since they suggest that the privilege only applies
to communications made by the client. It is clear, however, that the privi-
lege usually includes the statements made by the attorney in response to
the client's communications; otherwise, disclosure of the attorney's state-
60. In re Shapiro, 381 F.Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
61. Id. at 22-23.
62. Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 405.
63. Under the proposed rules communications made by the client or the attorney to a
person employed to assist the attorney in the rendition of professional legal services would
be covered by the privilege. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 503, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-36 (1972).
64. United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. at 1046.
65. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
66. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975). The court further stated that
while the privilege would cease to exist if the psychiatrist was called as a witness in the
client's behalf, the fact that the client asserted an insanity defense did not result in a waiver.
Id. at 1046-47. It is important to note that in this case the psychiatrist was not consulted for
the purpose of treatment or diagnosis, and thus a psychiatrist-patient privilege would not
cover the communications. Id. at 1046, n. 13.
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ments would ordinarily reveal the substance of the client's communica-
tions." However, because the privilege only extends to communications,
the attorney must usually disclose the client's name, or the fact that a
certain person has become a client, unless this would amount to the disclo-
sure of a confidential communication." In the latter case, revealing a
client's name would amount to disclosure of a confidential communication
if, for example, the substance of the communication was known but its
source had not been revealed."9
Wigmore's fourth requirement, that the communication must be made
in confidence, is probably the most important. 0 If the client intends that
the communication be made public or revealed to third persons, the privi-
lege will not apply.' The fact that the client has made the same statements
to third persons on other occasions is persuasive that the statements made
to the attorney were not intended to be confidential.72
Another problem which has arisen in connection with the attorney-client
privilege is the extent to which the privilege covers communications be-
tween an attorney and an employee of a corporate client. Federal courts
have developed two tests in order to determine when such communications
are privileged.7 3 The test most widely used is the "control group" test,
under which the communication is privileged if the employee is in a posi-
tion to control or take a substantial part in a decision concerning any
action to be taken on the attorney's advice, or if the employee is a member
of a group having such authority. 7 The other test, sometimes called the
Decker test,75 provides that the communication is privileged, even though
the employee is not a member of the "control group", if the employee made
the communication at the direction of his superiors and the subject matter
upon which the attorney's advice was sought by the corporation and dealt
with in the communication was within the employee's scope of employ-
ment. 71
67. In re Fischel, 557 F.2d at 211.
68. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
69. Id.
70. See In re Langswager, 392 F.Supp. 783, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400
(E.D. Va. 1975).
74. Id.
75. Harper & Rowe Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by
equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
76. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock, 68 F.R.D. at 400. The
proposed rules promulgated by the Supreme Court did not indicate which test should apply.
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With regard to communications between an attorney and client concern-
ing illegal activities in progress or yet to be performed, it is clear that such
communications are not covered by the attorney-client privilege. 7 When
the attorney himself is allegedly involved in the illegal activities, it has
been held that the relationship is not one of attorney-client, thus making
the privilege inapplicable. 58
B. Newsreporter-source
At common law there was no privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse
to reveal confidential information,79 and as yet no such privilege has been
recognized by the federal courts as a matter of federal. common law.9
However, some federal courts have recognized such a privilege protecting
the identity of a confidential source"' and confidential information ob-
tained from a source 2 based on First Amendment groundsYs
While the extent of the First Amendment privilege has not as yet been
clearly defined, some guidelines have emerged from several recent cases.
First, the privilege will not apply in grand jury proceedings where the
information sought to be protected is relevant to an investigation into the
commission of a crime.' However, the privilege may apply if the grand jury
investigation is instituted or conducted other than in good faith," or if the
information sought is not relevant to the investigation.8" In civil proceed-
The Advisory Committee felt that the matter should be resolved on a case-by-case basis. See
Advisory Committee's Note to proposed FED. R. EvID. 503, 56 F.R.D. at 237 (1972).
77. United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523, 546 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
78. Id.
79. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972).
80. The proposed rules promulgated by the Supreme Court did not provide for a
newsreporter-source privilege.
81. Baker v. F&F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973).
82. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F.Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976).
83. It is important to distinguish between a privilege recognized as a matter of federal
common law and a privilege based on constitutional grounds. If the privilege is recognized as
a matter of federal common law, then under rule 501 the privilege will not apply in federal
cases with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule
of decision. However, a privilege required by the Constitution would apply regardless of
whether or not state law supplies the rule of decision.
84. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 690-91.
85. Id. at 707-08.
86. Id. at 699-700. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Branzburg stated that the
claim of privilege should be judged on a case-by-case basis by balancing the interest in
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant te3timony with respect
to criminal conduct. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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ings it has been held that the First Amendment requires that newsmen be
given a privilege against revealing confidential sources, which can be abro-
gated only in rare and compeling circumstances.n It has been suggested
that one such circumstance in which the privilege would not apply would
be where the only access to information necessary for the development of
the case is through the newsman's sources, as in libel actions where the
truth of what the reporter published is in issue.
C. Husband-wife
Federal courts recognize two distinct privileges arising from the
husband-wife relationship. The first prevents one spouse from testifying
against the other, and the second prevents disclosure of confidential mar-
tial communications.8 9
The privilege barring one spouse from testifying against the other does
not survive a dissolution of the marriage by divorce, nor can the privilege
be invoked in cases where one spouse has committed an offense against the
other." Further, the privilege is waived by failure to object when the spouse
is called to the standA'
The privilege protecting confidential communications made during the
marriage does survive a divorce obtained prior to trial.12 While the privilege
only applies to communications which are intended to be confidential,
there is a presumption that marital communications are so intended.93
This presumption can be rebutted, however, by facts showing the commu-
nications were not intended to be confidential, such as the presence of a
third party at the time the communications were made, or the intention
that the information be conveyed to a third person. 4 Generally, the privi-
lege applies only to utterances, and not to acts. 5
D. Physician-patient
No physician-patient privilege existed at common law, and a physician
called as a witness was required to disclose all information obtained from
87. Baker v. F&F Investment, 470 F.2d at 783; Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F.Supp.
at 508.
88. Gilbert.v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F.Supp. at 510.
89. United States v. Lustig, 555 F. 2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977).
90. United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976).
91. United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
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a patient."6 While a majority of states have enacted statutes providing for
a physician-patient privilege, the privilege has been severely attacked by
commentators," and as yet no federal court has recognized the privilege
as a matter of federal common law. While there have been attempts to
claim a physician-patient privilege on constitutional grounds, based on the
right to privacy, the only federal case recognizing such a constitutionally
required privilege was reversed by the Supreme Court.9"
E. Psychiatrist-patient
The arguments in favor of granting a psychiatrist-patient privilege, ei-
ther as a matter of federal common law or based on a constitutional right
to privacy, are more persuasive than those in favor of a general physician-
patient privilege, and it has been stated that there is a practical need for
a privilege covering this relationship." It is generally recognized that the
psychiatrist's ability to treat patients depends on the patient's willingness
to talk freely, and thus effective treatment depends on the psychiatrist's
ability to assure his patients of confidentiality.' 0 As yet, however, no case
has directly recognized a psychiatrist-patient privilege, either on constitu-
tional grounds or as a matter of federal common law.'0 '
F. Communications to Clergymen
While there are only several recent cases concerning communications to
96. United states ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. 1038, 1040 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977). The proposed rules of evidence promulgated by the
Supreme Court did not include a general physician-patient privilege.
97. The reason generally advanced for the privilege is that a person might hesitate to get
medical aid if he knows his confidences can be disclosed in litigation. Commentators argue
that few people have litigation in mind when they consult a doctor for treatment, and even
if they did, medical treatment is so valuable that few would avoid it simply because commu-
nications made to the doctor could be disclosed in court. See, e.g., Chaffee, Privileged Com-
munications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness
Stand? 52 YALE L. J. 607, 609-10 (1943).
98. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977).
99. United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977). Proposed rule 504 of the rules of ev.dence promulgated
by the Supreme Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Proposed FED. R. EviD.
504 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972).
100. See generally Advisory Committee's Note to proposed rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241-42
(1972).
101. It has been stated that it would be desirable to protect psychotherapist-patient confid-
ences by an evidentiary privilege as a matter of social policy, whether or not such a privilege
was required on constitutional grounds. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 574 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
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clergymen, the federal courts appear to recognize such a privilege for a
confidential confession or other confidential communication made to a
clergyman by a penitent seeking spiritual rehabilitation. 02
G. Legislator's privilege
Under the guidelines of rule 501, a recent decision adopted as a matter
of federal common law a privilege for legislators.' 3 The privilege allows a
legislator, in a federal criminal proceeding in which he is involved, to
exclude any evidence of his actions performed in a strictly legislative ca-
pacity, his motivations for such actions, or any utterances made in the
course of his legislative duties.' 4 The privilege does not belong to the
legislature as an institution, but rather is personal in nature, belonging to
the legislator himself.'5
IV. PRIVILEGES RECOGNIZED UNDER VIRGINIA LAw
A. Attorney-client
Virginia recognizes a privilege for confidential communications between
an attorney and his client made because of the relationship and concerning
the subject matter of the attorney's employment.' 6 The purpose of the
privilege is to encourage the client to make a full disclosure of all facts,
without fear that the communications will be revealed by legal process.' 7
The privilege does not apply, however, to communications made in the
contemplation of a crime or the perpetration of a fraud. 00 Further, it has
been stated that there is no privilege if the client does not frankly reveal
to the attorney his purposes or intentions as well as the facts, since under
these circumstances there would be no professional confidence' 9
B. Newsreporter-source
Virginia recognizes a privilege related to the First Amendment which
protects a newsman from revealing the identity of a source and confidential
102. United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Verplank, 329 F.Supp. 433,
435 (C.D. Cal. 1971). A clergyman-communicant privilege was recognized in the proposed
rules of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court. Proposed FED. R. Evm. 506, 56 F.R.D.
183, 247 (1972).
103. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1977).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Grant v. Harris, 116 Va. 642, 648, 82 S.E. 718, 719, (1914).
107. Seventh Dist. Comm. v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 286-87, 183 S.E. 2d 713, 719.(1971).
108. Id. at 287, 183 S.E. at 719.
109. Id.
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information obtained from the source."10 The privilege is not absolute, how-
ever, and must yield when the need for the information is essential to a
fair trial, based on the requirements of due process."' It has been stated
that if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information is
material in proving an element of a criminal offense, or in proving a de-
fense, or to a mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense, then a
defendant's need to obtain the information is essential to a fair trial."2
Further, if such information is not otherwise available, a defendant has a
due process right to force disclosure of the identity of the source and the
information obtained from the source."3
C. Husband-wife
Virginia recognizes by statute two privileges based on the husband-wife
relationship. The first prevents one spouse from being called as a witness
against the other in criminal cases."' The privilege does not apply, how-
ever, in a prosecution for an offense committed by one spouse against the
other, or against a minor child of either spouse, or where one spouse is
charged with forging the name of the other."5 In these cases each spouse
will be competent to testify as a witness against the other, except as to
privileged communications."'
In two recent cases, Stewart v. Commonwealth"' and Jenkins v.
Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Supreme Court has considered several in-
tricacies of the criminal defendant's privilege to prevent his spouse from
being called as a witness against him.
In Stewart, the question was whether a decree of divorce a mensa et
thoro"5 (from bed and board), obtained after the date of the criminal
offense but before trial, would terminate the privilege, and thus permit the
110. Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E. 2d 429, 431 (1974), cert. denied,




114. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2.271.2 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. No. 780749 (Va. Mar. 2, 1979).
118. No. 771730 (Va. Jan. 12, 1979).
119. The court was concerned with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-116 (Rep..Vol. 1975), which pro-
vides that a court, in granting an a mensa decree, may decree that the parties be perpetually
separated and protected in their persons and property. The statute further provides that such
a decree operates upon the personal rights and legal capacities of the parties as a decree for
a divorce from the bond of matrimony, except that neither party can marry again during the
life of the other. Stewart v. Commonwealth, No. 780749 at 6 (Va. Mar. 2, 1979).
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defendant's spouse to testify against him. The court noted that the exist-
ence of the privilege is determined at the date of trial and depends upon
the couple being validly married at that time. The court held that the a
mensa decree terminated the defendant's privilege of preventing his wife
from testifying against him, stating that the wife's "legal capacity to tes-
tify after the divorce from bed and board was no different from what it
would have been if she had obtained a divorce from the bond of matri-
mony."'' 0 The court further reasoned that since the a mensa decree had
destroyed any vestige of matrimonial harmony which could be protected
by the defendant's assertion of the privilege, the reason for the privilege
no longer existed.'2 '
In Jenkins, 2 2 the defendant appealed convictions of the murder of one
Wilburn and the use of a firearm in the commission of that felony. The
evidence showed that the shot fired by the defendant which killed Wilburn
was aimed at the defendant's wife, who was seated beside Wilburn in
Wilburn's car. The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant
intended to shoot his wife, and the jury was instructed on the doctrine of
transferred intent. The trial court allowed the defendant's wife to testify
against the defendant, over his objection, on the ground that the evidence
disclosed an offense had been committed by the defendant against his wife,
and that Wilburn was killed during the commission of this offense. On
appeal, the court considered the language of the statute prohibiting one
spouse from testifying against the other'2 and reversed the convictions.
The court emphasized that the statutory exception was limited to a
prosecution for an offense committed by one spouse against the other.' 
2
The court held that since the defendant was tried under indictments
charging him with the murder of Wilburn and the use of a firearm in the
commission of that felony, neither of which was a prosecution for an offense
120. Stewart v. Commonwealth, No. 780749 at 6 (Va. Mar. 2, 1979). the court acknowl-
edged that VA. CODE ANN. § 20-120 (Repl. Vol. 1975) is an exception to the rule that all marital
rights and privileges are terminated by an a mensa decree. This section provides that the
parties to an a mensa decree have the right to make a joint application for revocation of the
decree. This revocation would reinstate the marriage with all of its rights and privileges. In
Stewart, however, the court found no evidence of revocation.
121. Stewart v. Commonwealth, No. 780749 at 7 (Va. Mar. 2, 1979).
122. No. 771730 (Va. Jan. 12, 1979).
123. At the time of defendant's trial this was VA. CODE ANN. § 8-288 (Cum. Supp. 1976),
which provided that the privilege did not apply "in the case of a prosecution for an offense
committed by one [spouse] against the other." This language is identical to that found in
the present statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
124. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, No. 771730 at 2 (Va. Jan. 12, 1979).
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committed against his wife, defendant's wife was incompetent to testify
against him.' z
As a sidelight to the Jenkins case, it is interesting to note that while the
court reversed the defendant's convictions, the court showed signs of dis-
pleasure at the fact that this result was mandated by the statute.' 2
The other privilege based on the husband-wife relationship protects pri-
vate communications made during the marriage.'1 This privilege survives
a divorce obtained prior to trial, but the privilege does not apply in actions
brought by one spouse against the other.'1 The privilege is also inapplica-
ble in legal proceedings concerning complaints of child abuse and neg-
lect.2 9
125. Id. at 4.
126. The court stated that while the statute (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (CuM. Supp. 1978))
required that the convictions be reversed, the following language from an earlier Virginia case
seemed particularly appropriate:
Professor Wigmore in his excellent work on Evidence . . . vigorously attacks the
privileges granted by the common law rule and the reasons upon which the rule is
based. We are not, however, called upon to pass upon the reasons for the rule, or the
wisdom of the law. A lack of good reason may be ground for the legislature to change
the law; but we must construe the law as it is.
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, No. 771730 at 4 (Va. Jan. 12, 1979) (quoting Meade v. Common-
wealth, 186 Va. 775, 784, 43 S.E. 2d 858, 862 (1947)).
It should be noted that the court in Jenkins left open the question of whether the defen-
dant's wife would be able to testify against the defendant if he also had been charged with
the commission of an offense against her, either in the same trial or a separate one. Since
the Commonwealth elected not to prosecute the defendant for any offense committed against
his wife, this precise question was not raised. This question has been raised in New Jersey,
under N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2) (West 1960), which provides that the privilege does
not apply if the accused is charged with an offense against his spouse. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that if there is a single criminal event in which the spouse and others
are targets or victims of the defendant's criminal conduct, and the defendant is charged with
some or all of the offenses committed, one of the charges being an offense committed against
the spouse, the spouse is a competent and compellable witness against the defendant at the
trial of all the cases. The court stated that the spouse would be competent to testify against
the defendant regardless of whether the cases were tried separately or all in one proceeding.
State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (1969).
In view of the displeasure which the Virginia Supreme Court seemed to express with the
result reached in Jenkins, the court might follow the New Jersey approach if this question is
raised in Virginia.
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (Repl. Vol. 1977). While this section states that the commu-
nications privilege applies only in civil actions, § 19.2-271.2 recognizes the privilege as applic-
able in criminal proceedings. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01.398 (Repl. Vol. 1977).




Virginia recognizes a physician-patient privilege by statute.''11 Unless the
patient has given his consent, a physician is not required to testify concern-
ing any information obtained from the patient which was necessary to
enable the physician to furnish professional care to the patient.' 3' The
privilege also applies to communications between a patient and a duly
licensed clinical psychologist.' This privilege only applies in civil actions,
and does not apply if the physical or mental condition of the patient is in
issue, or if the court deems disclosure necessary to the proper administra-
tion of justice.1' The privilege also is inapplicable in legal proceedings
concerning complaints of child abuse or neglect.'34
E. Ministers of Religion
By statute Virginia recognizes a privilege protecting communications
between ministers of religion and persons they counsel or advise.'13 A min-
ister is not required to disclose confidential information which is communi-
cated to him in his professional capacity and which is necessary to enable
him to perform the usual functions of his office, if the person communicat-
ing is seeking spiritual counsel and advice.'13 The privilege applies whether
the information concerns the person who is communicating or someone
else.' 3
V. CONCLUSION
Federal law and Virginia law offer two contrasting approaches to privi-
leged communications. Federal law, as embodied in rule 501, provides a
flexible approach, allowing the federal courts to develop the law of privi-
lege on a case-by-case basis. In Virginia, the law of privilege is largely
statutory, providing the courts with much less freedom to deal with the
subject of privileged communications as it arises under the facts of a par-
ticular case.
In view of the various competing interests which arise in the law of
privilege, such as the need for full disclosure of all relevant evidence, the
expectations of parties relying on the privilege, and the policies underlying




134. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.11 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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the privilege, there is an advantage in having a flexible, ease-by-case ap-
proach. Certainly cases can be imagined in which the recognition of a
privilege would not further its underlying policies, and would defeat rather
than serve the ends of justice by excluding needed information. The flexi-
ble approach of rule 501 allows federal courts to consider whether, under
the facts of the particular case, the need for disclosure of all relevant
evidence outweighs the claim for the privilege, or whether the information
can be disclosed in such a manner as to least offend the policies on which
the privilege is based. This approach seems superior to merely applying a
fixed rule which would exclude relevant evidence, but would not further
the policies on which the rule is based under the facts of a particular case.
There are, however, disadvantages to a flexible rule. The flexible ap-
proach will introduce a large amount of uncertainty into the law. The
ability to rely on a particular privilege will be lessened, since it will be
difficult to determine whether the privilege exists until after a suit has
been filed and the circumstances of the case have been considered. Another
disadvantage of the flexible approach is that it will be more difficult for
the courts to apply. Rather than applying a fixed rule, the courts will be
required to balance important and often controversial interests, at the
expense of judicial economy.
Thus, the choice between a flexible approach to the law of privilege, as
exemplified by rule 501, and a more rigid approach, as taken by Virginia,
is a difficult decision to make. The answer may depend in part on one's
view as to whether rules of privilege should be determined by the legisla-
ture or left to the courts. However, because of the importance of the con-
flicting interests involved, the need for disclosure against the need to pro-
tect certain relationships, the flexible case-by-case approach seems better
reasoned, and better suited to take these interests into account as they
arise in particular cases.
Roger L. Williams
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